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Abstract
A quantum-like description of human decision process is developed, and a heuristic argument
supporting the theory as sound phenomenology is given. It is shown to be capable of quan-
titatively explaining the conjunction fallacy in the same footing as the violation of sure-thing
principle.
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1. Introduction
Quantum game theory, which is the description of decision process of two quantum agents
mutually dependent on other’s decision, has had qualified success in analyzing some of the puz-
zling problems in game theory [1, 2, 3]. When one of the agent in the game theory is “frozen”,
namely, the decision of one of the agent is pre-fixed, it becomes a two stage decision process
for a single quantum agent, and this is the setting in which the quantum decision theory emerges
[4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11]. The source of the phenomenological success of the quantum game theory
in non-quantum settings is the flexibility of the theory capable of effectively incorporating the
altruism of the player through the language of quantum entanglement. Quantum decision the-
ory also has seen some successes in describing two long-standing psychological paradoxes, the
violation of sure-thing principle [12, 13], and the conjunction fallacy [14, 15]. It is very desir-
able, therefore, to look into the detailed workings of the quantum decision theory, to examine the
phenomenological effectiveness in more systematic fashion, and to identify its physical contents.
The purpose of this paper is two-fold. We first examine the relation between sure-thing-
principle violation and the conjunction fallacy. Next, we examine the “quantum” formula of
decision under unknown condition in terms of arithmetic and geometric averages, and try to
make sense as a useful phenomenology. The experimental numbers of conjunction fallacy are
analyzed with the quantum formula, and a satisfactory quantitative success is achieved.
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2. Conjunction fallacy and violation of sure-thing principle
Consider an agent who faces a two stage probabilistic process made up a condition and the
decision. Condition is chosen from two possibilities, which we respectively call condition 0 and
1, to which we assign probabilities q0 and q1. The decision of the agent consists of choosing from
two events, choices 0 and 1, to which we assign two numbers p0 j and p1 j, for each j = 0, and 1,
which respectively signify the probabilities of the agent choosing 0 and 1 under the condition j.
Let us now ask what the probability is of the agent making choice k irrespective of the con-
dition. The law of total probability tells that this probability, which we call Qk, has to be the
weighted sum of conditional probabilities pk0 and p10 with respective weights q0 and q1;
Qk = pk0q0 + pk1q1. (1)
Natrurally, all probablistic quantities q j and pk j are non-negative real numbers. In particular, we
have
q0 ≥ 0, q1 ≥ 0, (2)
from which we easily obtain
Max(pk0, pk1) ≥ Qk ≥ Min(pk0, pk1), (3)
namely, Qk has to be a number in between pk0 and pk1, which is often referred to as the sure-thing
principle.
From another trivial relations
pk0q0 ≥ 0, pk1q1 ≥ 0, (4)
we obtain
Qk ≥ pk0q0, Qk ≥ pk1q1, (5)
which simply express the logical inclusivity between the unconditional event k (a “constituent”)
whose probability is Qk, and the conditional component events (“conjunctions”) whose proba-
bilities are given by pk0q0 and pk1q1.
The experiments by Tversky and Shafir show that the sure-thing principle, (3), can be broken
in a two stage prisoners dilemma game [12, 13]. Separately, Tversky and Kahneman [14] have
found that the human often make seemingly illogical judgement that contradicts with logical
inclusivity (5), and judge that an instance is more likely to be a member of a conjunctive cate-
gory than of one of its constituent categories, to which they coin the term conjunction fallacy.
One vivid example is given by the story on Linda. People are presented with descriptions of a
bright young woman who was a philosophy major and concerned with social justice. Subsequent
answers to questionaires reveal that people believes it more likely that she is a feminist bank-
teller than just a bankteller, indicating the violation of inequalities (5) for subjective probabilities
involving human judgement.
3. Quantum-like description
Human sense often responds to the stimulus logarithmically rather than linearly. A recent
study indicates that human subjective probabilities have nonlinear psychophysical foundations
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[16]. In such cases, average response to two evens would be given by the geometric average, not
the algorithmic average. If such is the case for perception of two conjunction probabilities pk0q0
and pk1q1, we will perceive
QGk = 2
√
pk0q0 pk1q1, (6)
as the average of two probabilities, rather than the probability given by (1). It is possible that
the cognitive process sometime involves both elements (1) and (6), and is given by their linear
superposition
Qk = N1 · (pk0q0 + pk1q1) + N2 · 2√pk0q0 pk1q1. (7)
Since the geometric average can be only as big as the arithmetic average, N2 must be smaller
than N1 in order to ensure the non-negativity of this expression for all values of q j and pk j. This
observation leads to a parametrization using trigonometric functions with phase parameters θk,
Qk = N
(
pk0q0 + pk1q1 + 2
√
pk0q0 pk1q1 cos θk
)
. (8)
Finally, from the requirement of the unity of total probability, Q0 + Q1 = 1, N can be determined.
Thus we obtain the explicit form for the generalized average probability for two stage decision
process;
Qk =
pk0q0 + pk1q1 + 2
√
pk0q0 pk1q1 cos θk
1 + 2
√
p00q0 p01q1 cos θ0 + 2
√
p10q0 p11q1 cos θ1
. (9)
This two parameter expression happens to coincide exactly with the result obtained from the
quantum decision theory [9]. It is easy to show that, for unknown θk, this expression is bounded
by
(
√
pk0q0 +
√
pk1q1)2
1 + 2
√
q0q1(
√
pk0 pk1 − √pk¯0 pk¯1)
≥ Qk ≥
(
√
pk0q0 − √pk1q1)2
1 − 2√q0q1(√pk0 pk1 − √pk¯0 pk¯1)
. (10)
For unknown q j, on top of indeterminate θk, we obtain the trivial inequality
1 ≥ Qk ≥ 0. (11)
It is possible, with proper values of θk to break either of the two “classical” ineualities (3) and
(5) or the both.
It is possible to conjecture that there is a way to construct a neural model that processes two
stage probabilistic event and produces this type of result, which could be a good simulation of the
actual neural network at work in our brain. In fact, a recent neuroeconomic study demonstrated
that nonlinearity in subjective probabilities is determined with dopamine D1 receptors in the hu-
man brain [17]. If, for some reason, this setup with specific value of θk had proven evolutionarily
advantageous, as a mean to achieve optimal risk management against unknown conditions of our
environment, for example, it would be likely that such seemingly “illogical” traits have been left
in our mind.
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4. Relation to single-phase approach
The quantum formula for two-choice condition and two-choice decision, (9), has two inde-
pendent parameters, θ0 and θ1, and is not simple enough for our intuition to grasp its meaning at
the first glance. We show that it can be reduced to one-parameter formula if some conditions are
met for the probabilities and the parameters appearing there.
Let us suppose that we can impose a parametric relation
2
√
p00 p01 cos θ0 + 2
√
p10 p11 cos θ1 = 0 (12)
on θ0 and θ1. The expression (9) is reduced to a very simple form
Qk = pk0q0 + pk1q1 + 2
√
pk0q0 pk1q1 cos θk. (13)
If we further assume the condition
p00 p01 = p10 p11, (14)
we obtain cos θ0 = − cos θ1, and with the notation θ = θ0, we have
Qk = pk0q0 + pk1q1 + (−1)k 2√pk0q0 pk1q1 cos θ, (15)
which is identical the Franco’s approach [8] for the analysis conjunction fallacy. It shoud be
noted that we may not always be lucky enough to be able to assume (14), since probabilities pk j
is a given input quantity for each experiment, not an adjustable parameter.
5. Analysis of experimental numbers
There is a set of fourteen pairs of data on conjunction fallacy readily available, coming the
experiments conducted by Shafir et al. [15]. We first pick up two of them to fix the phase
parameters, and then see whether the rest of the data are well-described by our formula (9).
The data are incomplete in the sense that not all input probabilities are measured. At first sight,
therefore, it appears unlikely that we can determin the quantum parameters from the data as
they are. However, we shall show in the following, that with certain plausible assumptions, the
information on the phase can be extracted if two data are used in combination.
We take up two numbers from the experiment (1-i) and (1-c) of the Table 1 of [15], that
respectively typify “low probability” and “high probability” events. Participants in the experi-
ment are given the information (“instance”) “Linda was a philosophy major. She is bright and
concerned with issue of discrimination and social justice.”
In the experiment (1-i), the conditional event (“constituent”) is given as the answer to the
question whether Linda is a feminist (1) or not (0). The decision event (another “constituent”) is
given as the answer to the question whether Linda is a bank teller (1) or not (0). The probabilities
q1, q0, respectively corresponding to Linda being a feminist or not, are not specified, but q1 ≡ q
is supposed to be “a large number”, meaning q > 12 . Experimental numbers for the conjunction
probabilities under the condition (1) are given by
p11q1 = 0.401, p01q1 = q1 − 0.401. (16)
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The other conditional probabilities p10 ≡ p, p00 = 1− p are also not known, but p10 is considered
to be equal or bigger than p11, namely p10 ≥ 0.401/q1. The probabilities under mixed condition
are measured to be
Q1 = 0.241, Q0 = 0.759. (17)
In the experiment (1-c), the conditional event (“constituent”) is the same as in (1-i), and
given as the answer to the question whether Linda is a feminist (1) or not (0). The decision event
(another “constituent”) is given now as the answer to the question whether Linda is a teacher (1)
or not (0). The conjunction probabilities under the condition (1) are experimentally determined
to be
p11q1 = 0.601, p01q1 = q1 − 0.601. (18)
For this case, we adopt the notation p10 ≡ p′, p00 = 1 − p′ and assume p10 ≥ 0.601/q1. The
probabilities under mixed condition are measured to be
Q1 = 0.533, Q0 = 0.467. (19)
If we assume that these two experimental values are described by single set of phase param-
eters θ j, we have
0.241 =
p(1 − q) + 0.401 + 2 √0.401p(1 − q) cos θ1
1 + 2
√
(q − 0.401)(1 − p)(1 − q) cos θ0 + 2
√
0.401p(1 − q) cos θ1
, (20)
0.533 =
p′(1 − q) + 0.601 + 2 √0.601p′(1 − q) cos θ1
1 + 2
√
(q − 0.601)(1 − p′)(1 − q) cos θ0 + 2
√
0.601p′(1 − q) cos θ1
. (21)
We can revert this relation to obtain the phases θk as functions of p, p′, and q, namely,
θk = θk(p, p′; q) . (22)
cos θ1
cos θ0
1.0
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0.8
1.0
0
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cos θj
p
p’
0.8
0.9
q=0.75
1.0
Figure 1: This graph depicts the values of cos θ0 and cos θ1 for given values of p and p′ with the assumption q = 0.75.
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In Figure.1, cos θ0 and cos θ1 are plotted as functions of p = p11 for (1-i), and p′ = p11 fro
(1-c) with the assumption q = 0.75. At the relevant region, cos θ j are more or less flat, and we
have cos θ0 = 0.391 and cos θ1 = −0.812 at p = 0.601/q = 0.801, which gives the values of the
phases
θ0 = 0.52pi, θ1 = 0.82pi (with q1 =
3
4
). (23)
In Figure.2, we use this estimate to plot theoretical prediction of Q1 as a function of p11q1
along with all twenty eight experimental values taken from Table 1 of [15]. Here, p10 is assumed
to be equal to p11. The deviation from Q1(p11) = p11q1, which is given by the dashed line,
indicates the existence of the conjunction fallacy. From this figure, it is clear that the “quan-
tum” prediction gives a rather good overall description of the experimental data that shows the
existence of conjunction fallacy in statistically significant fashion.
Calculation with other values within the reasonable range 1 > q > 0.65 reveals that θ j(p, p′, q)
is a smooth and mild function of q in this range, and the situation essentially remains the same.
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
Q1
0.80.60.40.20.0
p11q1
θ0= 0.52π
θ1= 0.82π
q1=0.75
Figure 2: This graph depicts theoretical prediction of Qq versus p11q1 with the assumption q1 = 0.75 and the quantum
phase parameters θ0 = 0.52pi, θ0 = 0.82pi. Experimental data, taken from [15], are shown with upward triangle for ”(i)”
series and downward triangle for ”(c)” series. Encircled data are the ones used to determined the phase parameter as
shown in Figure.1.
When one of the phases, say θ0 is close to pi2 , which is what we have essentially obtained in
above estimate, one of the interference term disappears, and with the Taylor expansion of the
remaining interference term, we obtain
Q0 ≈ p00q0 + p01q1 − 2√p10 p11q0q1(p00q0 + p01q1) cos θ1,
Q1 ≈ p10q0 + p11q1 + 2√p10 p11q0q1(p00q0 + p01q1) cos θ1. (24)
Curiously, this is another case in which single phase expression (15)-(20) becomes valid with the
“effective phase” Θ = Θ(θ1, p00, p01) defined by
cos Θ = (p00q0 + p01q1) cos θ1. (25)
In hindsight, the success of one-parameter formula [8] could be attributed to this particular ar-
rangement.
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The current results should be compared to the value of quantum phases obtained in our previ-
ous study of sure-thing principle violation [9], in which two phases take the value θ0 ∼ θ1 ∼ 2.7
that give something rather close to the maximum destructive interference.
Our estimate of θ j shown above illustrates how a reasonable phenomenology can be con-
structed even with experiments with lots of ”unknowns”. Clearly, more experimental studies
with explicit values for currently unmeasured q j and pk j should be very helpful.
6. Prospects
We have shown in this work that it is possible to understand the two paradoxical phenomena
in psychology, sure-thing principle violation and conjunction fallacy, both found by the Tver-
sky group, in a unified single framework. They can be regarded as two extreme special cases
of non-additivity of probabilistic decision process, for which psychological understanding are
still lacking, but which are successfully describable by phenomenological formula derived from
quantum decision theory. Judging from the quantitative success of the result, it appears likely,
that our approach gives a basis for viable phenomenologies on human decision process for which
theories based on classical probability have failed. It would be interesting to combine our theory
with experimental studies that utilize fMRI, with which it might even be possible identify neural
signal behind the “quantum interference” related phenomena.
The conjunction fallacy could be studied also within the framework of nonlinear subjec-
tive probability in prospect theory [18, 19]. This theory is based on the concept of probability
weighting with sub-additive probability for which probability of all events do not necessarily
add up to unity. It predicts, among other things, the concavity alternation of Qk(pk jq j) at around
pk jq j = 1/e ≈ 0.37 [20], and two-valued Qk at around pk jq j = 0.5, en route to the description of
the conjunction fallacy. With the current status of quantity and quality of the experiments, it still
remains to be seen whether those effects are actually observed in the data. Better experimental
data in the future should be instrumental in sorting out the phenomenological effectiveness of
both subjective probability theory and quantum theory of the conjunction fallacy.
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